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I. INTRODUCTION
Everyday businesses, private citizens, and even countries engage in in-
ternational trade transactions. These transactions can raise a multitude of issues
pertaining, for example, to price, quantity, security, or the problems of interna-
tional cross-border litigation. Because of the many issues that can arise, and the
difficulties of cross-border litigation, arbitration has become increasingly popu-
lar and common in international business transactions.' This form of dispute
settlement has grown to particular consequence in today's society where grow-
ing efforts to find more efficient and effective means of adjudication are at the
utmost premium.2
In fact, it is not hard to understand the attraction of arbitration in inter-
national business. The typical international transaction may be between parties
of different language, culture, and most importantly legal or judicial systems.
The potential barriers that are presented can cause many problems, for the most
part, because international parties do not wish to submit to a foreign court's
jurisdiction. These parties may wish to do business together, but because of the
disparities or difficulties that will exist if any disputes arise, there may be a
chilling effect on trade. Arbitration, however, creates a flexible option for dis-
pute resolution that allows parties to agree, by contract, to the forum and the
rules for the dispute resolution.3 In this way, arbitration helps parties avoid
I See generally CHRISTIAN BOHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS (Dr. Julian Lew ed., 1996); WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS DIspuTEs: STUDIES IN LAW AND PRACTICE (2006).
2 See, e.g., Thomas D. Barton, Common Law and its Substitutes: The Allocation of Social
Problems to Alternative Decisional institutions, 63 N.C. L. REV. 519 (1985) (looking outside the
current legal system to find other decision-making institutions that could render more efficient
dispute settlement processes); Brian A. Liang, Understanding and Applying Alternative Dispute
Resolution Methods in Modern Medical Conflicts, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 397 (1998) (discussing the
need for the healthcare field to find more efficient means to adjudicate or resolve disputes); Frank
Partnoy, Synthetic Common Law, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 281 (2005) (suggesting the creation of a
device, "synthetic common law," which would allow parties to stipulate which cases or rules
should specifically apply to a dispute, therefore allowing for a more efficient and predictable
result); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering ofPublic Adjudication,
84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 514 (2009) (arguing that parties should have the option to choose procedural
devices to be used in public adjudication, as in private dispute settlement, as it would lead to more
efficient results); Giesela Riuhl, Methods and Approaches in Choice ofLaw: An Economic Pers-
pective, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 801 (2006) (focusing on choice of law provisions as a means to
make international litigation more efficient).
3 International arbitration can come in many shapes and sizes. It is due to its flexible nature
that, although the general principles are the same, there is often great latitude for creativity and
other procedural mechanisms that allow parties to literally create their own dispute resolution
process. For some articles that discuss these measures, see BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 45;
Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full Court Press: International Commercial Arbitration and
Other Global Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes, 40 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1337 (2007); Claude
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many practical problems. Because of the explosive growth in popularity of in-
ternational arbitration, the subject of international arbitration has been discussed
and reviewed by numerous scholars. 4
The current arbitral model does have flaws, some of which can prove
fatal to any dispute that comes before it. The most commonly cited advantages
of arbitration-efficiency, finality, arbiter expertise, enforceability, and honor-
ing party intentions5-are supposed to meet and resolve any problems that arbi-
tration may face. On the other hand, the disadvantages of arbitration-finality
acting as a deterrent, accuracy being sacrificed for efficiency, arbitrator exper-
tise hindering neutrality, and the problems posed by multi-party disputes 6 -can
equally be seen as detriments to parties that use it. The pros and cons of interna-
tional arbitration have been discussed at length in regards to general commercial
trade.7 These considerations are correct in their assertions and reviews of the
process when dealing in general commercial trade. Arbitration is popular for a
4 See, e.g., Helen Tavares Erickson, Litigation Versus Arbitration in the Americas: Advantag-
es and Disadvantages From a New York Perspective, 15 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 4 (2002) (discussing
problems generally affecting international arbitration, in comparison to litigation, through the use
of a hypothetical problem); Shekhar Kumar, Virtual Venues: Improving Online Dispute Resolu-
tion as an Alternative to Cost Intensive Litigation, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 81
(2009) (analyzing certain upcoming trends in international arbitration with a focus on the potential
benefits of using electronic arbitration); Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Law-
lessness: A "Second Look" at International Commercial Arbitration, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 453
(1999) (discussing the inherent "lawlessness" of international arbitration as it allows parties to
agree to essentially anything and the importance that there be certain required procedural safe-
guards); William W. Park, Determining an Arbitrator's Jurisdiction: Timing and Finality in
American Law, 8 NEv. L.J. 135 (2008) (analyzing the extent and power that an arbitrator has over
a dispute, focusing on jurisdiction); William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbi-
tration, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 805 (1999) (examining the importance of when courts make decisions
regarding arbitral final orders, they must weigh two policies: extending comity to foreign jurisdic-
tions and enforcement of the arbitral award); Michael H. Strub, Jr., Resisting Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards under Article V(1)(e) and Article VI of the New York Convention: A
Proposal for Effective Guidelines, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1031 (1990) (discussing the New York Con-
vention and the means by which a court will resist or enforce an arbitral award); Jessica L. Gelan-
der, Note, Judicial Review ofInternational Arbitral Awards: Preserving Independence in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitrations, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 625 (1997) (discussing the need for some form
of judicial review of arbitral awards but also acknowledging the importance of independence for
arbitration); Nana Japaridze, Note, Fair Enough? Reconciling the Pursuit of Fairness and Justice
with Preserving the Nature of International Commercial Arbitration, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1415
(2008) (focusing on the element of fairness that accompanies international arbitration and the
justice that follows).
See BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 136-138; Benjamin J.C. Wolf, On-line but Out of
Touch: Analyzing International Dispute Resolution Through the Lens of the Internet, 14 CARDOZO
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 281, 301 (2006).
6 See Wolf, supra note 5, at 307.
7 See, e.g., BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 136-138; Eric D. Green, International Commer-
cial Dispute Resolution: Courts, Arbitration, and Mediation-Introduction, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 175
(1997); Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives to Litigation ofInternational Disputes, 23 INT'L LAW. 187,
197 (1989); Wolf, supra note 5, at 301; see infra Part II and accompanying text.
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reason; it has obvious advantages over traditional litigation. However, it remains
to be seen if arbitration will be as advantageous in other areas of trade.
One such area is the trade and development of natural resources. Being
that natural resources and energy trade are central to every nation's domestic
market and consequentially to the international market, it is a topic that must be
addressed. Natural resources trade and development is one of the fastest grow-
ing and most in-demand areas of international commercial activity, and subse-
quently arbitration.8 This is due to the increased globalization of national mar-
kets and the continuous rise in demand for energy sources.9 There are certain
factors that are unique to natural resources trade that prohibit the traditional
arbitral model from being effective; however, simply assuming these issues will
correct themselves is not the answer. A far more critical examination of the
problems arbitration is faced with when dealing in the energy sector is required
in order for arbitration in the international market to continue to grow.
Of the problems that are presented in arbitration proceedings, enforce-
ment of the final order award is one of the most detrimental to the process and
model. The lack of enforcement, and confidence in it occurring, leads to the
other problems that arise from arbitration. This seems to be particularly abun-
dant in the trade and development of natural resources. This Note, therefore,
will look at the inherent problems with natural resources arbitration and the im-
portance that this be addressed in order to avoid future problems.
Difficulty in enforcement is not a problem unique to arbitration law, and
an examination of other areas of the law reveals concepts that can be usefully
applied in the arbitration context to address this challenging problem. Accor-
dingly, this Note will suggest pulling certain concepts of contract and property
law to deal with this and other problems as a means to address issues of enfor-
ceability. In order to better understand and examine these issues properly, this
Note will begin with a foundation briefly describing the legal framework and
then laying out the most commonly cited and discussed advantages and disad-
vantages of arbitration. Next, it will set out a case study dealing with natural
resources trade and arbitration, which puts these propositions to the test. The
case study will begin with a detailed illustration of the case background and will
be followed with a section applying these pros and cons to the facts and proce-
dural posture of the case. This Note then will show that arbitration failed in this
case study and will demonstrate its failure through an analysis of the facts and
how the advantages missed the target.
Following that section, this Note will point out the continual problems
that natural resources arbitration cases involve, and discuss why the traditional
arbitral model does not work as is currently used. Finally, some suggestions will
be offered as a stepping stone to begin to address these problems and create
8 See generally JOHAN BILLET ET. AL., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE ENERGY
SECTOR (Maklu & Association for International Arbitration ed., 2009).
9 See U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2010 (July
2010), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/ieol 0/pdf/0484(201 0).pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
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further awareness in order to engage in a more robust policy debate for change
to arbitral law.'o
II. FOUNDATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
Today, arbitration is the most prominent form of international alterna-
tive dispute resolution." The principle reason for its supremacy is its capability
to bridge the gaps between different legal systems. 12 Arbitration grants parties
the ability to dictate the terms, rules, and location of where any dispute will be
heard. This is often times more appealing to international parties, who instead of
relying on their own national courts, can opt for a private dispute resolution
system that is contracted to in advance.' 3 There are many attributes of arbitra-
tion that can make it valuable to those selecting to use it. However, to each ad-
vantage there are also certain disadvantages that many critics raise.
A. Legal Framework
International arbitration is largely unrestricted and unregulated.' 4 It is a
creature that has grown out of contract law and other forms of alternative dis-
pute resolution. There is, however, a certain overarching legal framework that
provides guidance and rules to persons engaging in international arbitration.
This framework is drawn primarily from the interplay of private party contrac-
tual relations, national legal systems, and international conventions." This sec-
tion will briefly discuss how international arbitral structure is affected by the
consequences of contractual relations between parties, the direct impact of na-
tional court systems, and finally, the most important multinational arbitration
agreement.
1. Contractual Arrangements
There is a decision that parties will make before any arbitral proceed-
ings or disputes arise; it will occur in the language of the initial arbitration
10 Ultimately, the author would like international institutions such as the International Cham-
ber of Commerce or International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes to engage in the
sort of debate described and to either draw upon this article for support or at the very least use it to
identify the problems with the current system.
I BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 141.
12 Wolf, supra note 5, at 282.
13 Id.
14 See generally BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 55; RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL BusINESs TRANSACTIONS 773 (2d ed. 2010).
1s BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 55 ("[T]hree levels of regimes are governing international
commercial arbitration: the contractual arrangements of the parties, the various national legal
systems that have an impact on the arbitration, and international agreements between states.").
2011] 313
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clause that is within the parties' trade agreement or contract. The parties will
choose to either engage in either ad hoc or institutional arbitration. 16 Ad hoc
arbitration is the traditional form of arbitration where the parties choose the
rules and means by which they will proceed if a dispute arises.17 Ad hoc arbitra-
tion procedures can be agreed upon in advance, or literally, the rules can be cho-
sen ad hoc, when the dispute comes about.18 On the other hand, parties may
choose to pursue the route of institutional arbitration, where they would agree to
employ the services of an arbitration institution.1 9 Parties that agree to submit to
institutional arbitration have less of a hand in the customization of the proce-
dures by which their dispute will be resolved as the private service takes care of
those details through their own model rules.20
2. National Legal Systems
National legal systems have a substantial impact on a host of issues that
face international arbitration. These issues may range from determining jurisdic-
tion of the arbitral panel to eventual enforcement of the award. 2 1 However, the
most important impact that national legal systems have on international arbitra-
tion is for the latter issue. It is not until the sovereign power of a national legal
system is sought out that an arbitral award can actually be collected. Without the
confirmation power of courts, the award is simply voluntary. The importance of
this power, which is held by a nation's courts, cannot be understated because it
is through the sovereign that a winning party can attach assets that a losing party
may not wish to so easily concede.22
16 See BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 45; FOLSOM, supra note 14, at 776.
17 See BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 45.
FOLSOM, supra note 14, at 776.
19 BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 46.
20 Id at 46-50 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of choosing between ad hoc and
institutional arbitration); FOLSOM, supra note 14, at 776 ("Institutional arbitration is in a sense pre-
packaged, and the parties need only 'plug in' to the arbitration system of their choice. There are
numerous competing centers of arbitration, each busy marketing its desirability to the world busi-
ness community."); see, e.g., W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION (3d ed. 2000) (discussing rules of a particular institutional service and
the means by which it provides arbitration services).
21 BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 61 ("As in transnational litigation, the impact of multiple
national legal systems is manifested in several respects: the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal
determines whether the process can validly be conducted at the exclusion of other processes (1);
procedural questions control how the process is conducted (2); in most cases national laws are
applied to the substance of the dispute (3); finally the treatment of the award determines what
effect the results of the process will have (4)."). For a more in depth discussion of these issues and
illustrations of their impacts, see id.
22 Id. at 56 ("[A]s a practical matter, the private arbitration agreement as well as any interna-
tional conventions will only have the effect that national legal systems confer upon them.").
314 [Vol, 114
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3. International Agreements
International agreements are the final pillar in the legal framework of
international arbitration.23 These can, to a degree, be considered to have had the
most significant impact on harmonizing the international arbitral process. The
most notable of these international conventions, and subsequent agreements, is
the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"). 24 There are over 140 coun-
tries that are signatories to the convention and agreement that facilitates the en-
forcement of arbitral awards. 2 5 The overall goal and fundamental purpose of the
New York Convention is to make arbitral awards easily enforceable from one
country to the next.26
The New York Convention assigns the courts in each signatory country
the task to recognize and enforce arbitration clauses and written agreements for
the resolution of commercial disputes. 27 The New York Convention also re-
quires courts to recognize and enforce, under local procedural rules, the awards
rendered by arbitral tribunals. Application of the New York Convention turns
on where the award was made or will be made. 29 However, the Convention also
covers the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in non-
23 Id. at 74.
24 See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 9 U.S.C. § 201, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. For some general background and anal-
ysis concerning the New York Convention, see, for example, BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 75;
JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 266 (1999) (stating the underlying purposes of the New York
Convention are "(i) arbitration agreements are recognised as valid, and as precluding litigation of
the dispute in the State's courts; (ii) foreign arbitral awards are recognised and enforced, except in
certain exceptional circumstances; and (iii) the grounds on which recognition or enforcement
might refused are strictly limited."); FOLSOM, supra note 14, at 782; Thomas H. Oehmke, Interna-
tional laws and treaties-New York Convention, 2 CoM. ARB. § 41:5 (2010). In addition to all the
discussion about the New York Convention, there are also several other treaties that impact arbi-
tration but tend to be more regional. See the above sources for descriptions of many of these as
well. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 322 (1986) (describing the New York Convention's role in both resisting and en-
forcing arbitral awards).
25 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Status 1958-Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention-status.html (last
visited Oct. 12, 2011).
26 WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS: A PRIMER ON DRAFTING,
NEGOTIATING AND RESOLVING DISPUTES 346 (3d ed. 1998) ("Fundamentally, the New York Con-
vention is an attempt to make arbitral awards rendered in one country fully effective in any other
signatory country.").
27 FOLSOM, supra note 14, at 783.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 784.
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signatory countries where the arbitrating parties are from signatory countries.30
Finally, the New York Convention sets forth the limited procedural grounds by
which a national court may resist enforcement of an arbitral award.3' In addition
to procedural grounds, a court may refuse to recognize or enforce an award if it
would be contrary to public policy or if the subject matter of the dispute cannot
be settled by arbitration. 32 It is for these reasons that the New York Convention
allows for a higher level of enforceability of arbitral awards and for a narrow
window of defenses to be raised by losing parties or courts. These provide to
promote the overall goals of arbitral enforcement while providing certain pro-
tections to parties who may have suffered arbiter abuse.
4. Overview
Recall that there is a constant intermingling of the three forms of legal
systems that make up the framework for international arbitration. These consist
of both informal and formal measures that set the stage for the resolution of
disputes through arbitration. These three forms should be analyzed together
while keeping in mind the distinct nature of each one and how each form can
change and the rate by which those changes can occur. This will help with the
upcoming sections and, in particular, the case study later in this article.
30 Fox, supra note 26, at 347 ("For example, the New York Convention will govern an arbitral
award between an Argentine seller and a Zairean buyer (both non-signatory nations) if the award
was made in London because the United Kingdom, the place where the award was made, is a
signatory. Similarly, the New York Convention will apply to an arbitral award made in Argentina
between a British and a U.S. party."). This is a good example of the New York Convention's
application, regardless to the fact that Argentina is now a signatory. See supra note 25 and accom-
panying text.
31 See FOLSOM, supra note 14, at 783. According to the text of the New York Convention, a
court has grounds to refuse enforcement, that include:
(1) incapacity or invalidity of the agreement containing the arbitration clause
"under the law applicable to" a party to the agreement,
(2) lack of proper notice of the arbitration proceedings, the appointment of the
arbitrator or other reasons denying an adequate opportunity to present a de-
fense,
(3) failure of the arbitral award to restrict itself to the terms of the submission
to arbitration, or decision of matters not within the scope of that submission,
(4) composition of the arbitral tribunal not according to the arbitration agree-
ment or applicable law, and
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B. Advantages
Arbitration's most frequently-cited qualities include its efficient nature;
the finality it carries with it; the option for parties to choose an arbitrator with
subject-matter expertise; the relative ease with which international arbitral
awards are enforced, compared to international litigation awards; and its institu-
tional goal, as a contractual construct, to best honor the parties' intentions.3 3
Each of these will be discussed in turn.
1. Efficiency
Arbitration has long been praised as being more efficient and effective
than litigation. There are heavy financial and emotional costs of going to court
that have been well documented. 3 However, through arbitration, parties are able
to bypass many of the sluggish characteristics of traditional litigation. The time
that parties may save, by avoiding the scheduling of hearings and the over-
crowding of court dockets, often makes arbitration worthwhile.3 ' Arbitrators
also have a strong interest in adhering to a schedule established on the basis of
convenience to the parties, counsel, and themselves. 36 This allows parties to be
more apt to come together without a judicial mandate forcing them to meet.
This is possible through the relative flexibility of arbitration, which al-
lows parties to schedule around their needs. 37 The informal nature of arbitration
also produces several additional benefits. Arbitration proceedings that are not
burdened by the minutiae of rules of procedure and rigid structure serve a two-
fold benefit. First, tensions are lessened between all parties which may help
facilitate resolution. 39 Second, in many cultures, arbitration provides a "face-
saving" approach to dispute resolution.4 0 Many times in litigation, parties put so
much emphasis on winning a dispute that it becomes impossible to move closer
to resolution. 4 1 Arbitration provides an environment that allows those who may
hope for settlement, but do not wish to appear to be the supplicant, a means to
33 Wolf, supra note 5, at 301.
34 See, e.g., Peter Huang, Emotional Adaptation and Lawsuit Settlements, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 50 (2008); Peter Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 INT'L
REV. L. & EcoN. 31 (1992); Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L. J. 1977 (2001).
3s See BUHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 137; Wolf, supra note 5, at 301.
36 See Osamu Inoue, The Due Process Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards in United States Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Standard, 11 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 247, 251 (2000).
3 BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 138; Nelson, supra note 7, at 197.
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do so without damage to reputation.42 In other words, arbitration allows for a
party that wishes to end a dispute to do so, but also, not to "lose face" by being
recognized as the party at fault by a formal judge or jury declaration.
Additionally, arbitration does not generally involve the same breadth of
discovery as traditional litigation, which many times is an advantage for parties
that are concerned with disclosure of trade secrets or other important commer-
cial documents. 4 3 Parties also save time by retaining broad discretion in structur-
ing all proceedings, which can lead to an avoidance of costly pre-trial and post-
trial work through reduced lawyer fees." The time and money that can be saved
by using an arbitral tribunal compared to a traditional court is one of the most
appealing qualities of arbitration.
2. Finality
Many disputes that occur in the international arena are between large
multinational corporations or business trading partners. The globalization of the
world economy has led to a dramatic increase in the number of international
contractual obligations every year.4 5 Due to this increase and the long lasting
relationships that develop between these companies, there has been a greater
emphasis for finality in disputes. Proponents of arbitration insist that because
there is no appeal mechanism, on the merits of the dispute, it is a benefit to par-
ties that have continuing relationships.46 These corporations require urgency that
will allow parties to resolve a dispute without destroying the business relation-
ship and goodwill necessary with it. 4 7 In these situations a final decision allows
the parties to resolve the dispute, preferably in an amicable fashion, and move
on to continue in a profitable manner.
Another aspect of finality that is sometimes less emphasized is the pri-
vacy attribute of arbitration. Traditional litigation is almost always of public
record, depending on the country, which can be accessed by anyone. The greater
42 Id
43 BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 136; Nelson, supra note 7, at 197.
4 Wolf, supra note 5, at 302.
45 William H. Knull, III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on International Arbitration: Is
it Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 531, 537 (2000) ("[W]ith major
infrastructure, energy, manufacturing and other contracts now attracting financing and participa-
tion with the increasing globalization of the world economy, there are more and more very large
international transactions in which the stakes can be tens, hundreds, or even thousands of millions
of dollars. Projects may involve investments lasting decades, increasing the likelihood of a major
dispute at some point in the project's life.").
46 BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 136-38; Wolf, supra note 5, at 302.
47 Nelson, supra note 7, at 198 ("If business people withdraw from the dispute resolution
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level of confidentiality 48 afforded by arbitration over litigation may in itself be
the goal of the parties involved. 49 As stated, many times the companies seeking
arbitration are large corporations that when a dispute arises do not wish, for a
variety of reasons, for the public or competitors to learn about it.50 This is ac-
complished through arbitration, which offers private proceedings, and because
they are also efficient, the matter can wrap up quickly and quietly. In addition,
privacy plays into protecting the underlying commercial relationship by shiel-
ding it from any possible harm as a result of publicized dispute.51 Due to the
nature of long-term contractual relationships and the fact that they may lead to
conflicts,52 parties often require a dispute resolution system that enables quick
and agreeable resolutions.5 3
3. Expertise
Arbitration typically allows the parties to choose an arbitrator with a
technical background in the subject matter of the underlying dispute. 54 Arbitra-
tors do not need to be lawyers, and the common use of panels of arbitrators al-
lows for the inclusion of both technical and legal experts.5 5 The arbitrator's ex-
pertise is especially relevant to resolution where the dispute involves interpreta-
tions, customs, and technical standards to a party's trade or industry.56 An arbi-
trator, unlike a judge, is not only free to draw upon his background, but is en-
couraged to do so in order to help resolve a dispute. 7
An arbitration panel that has a breadth of expertise in a dispute will help
bolster the accuracy of a decision, by being well-educated in the field, but also
will save time as the parties will not have to educate a judge or jury in order for
them to understand the material. A prime example of this benefit is as follows:
48 The words "confidentiality" and "privacy" will be used interchangeably in this article; how-
ever, in arbitration there is a slight distinction that will not be discussed here. For a good discus-
sion of this difference and its impact on commercial arbitration see Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling
the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 1211 (2006).
49 BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 136; Nelson, supra note 7, at 198.
so Nelson, supra note 7, at 197-198.
51 Id. at 199.
52 Green, supra note 7, at 175 ("The investments required to compete effectively expose busi-
nesses to all of the uncertainties inherent in any long-term interdependent relationship plus those
associated with cross-cultural, transnational matters, including possible expropriation by one's
partner, submission to the jurisdiction of foreign courts, and reliance on an alien legal system.").
5 Wolf, supra note 5, at 304.
54 BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 136-138; Wolf, supra note 5, at 304.
5 Nelson, supra note 7, at 197.
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In one commercial dispute .. . the arbitrators awarded the buyer
money damages for non-delivery even though no evidence as to
the market price of the goods had been introduced. Judge
Learned Hand dismissed the seller's arguments that this consti-
tuted arbitral "misconduct," remarking that if the arbitrators
"were of the trade, they were justified in resorting to their per-
sonal acquaintance with its prices."
The use of panels has become almost automatic when arbitration is employed
and its use allows for great benefits.
4. Enforcement
Enforcement of a judgment in international litigation is sometimes more
difficult than winning the actual case.59 Whenever parties enter into litigation
and choose a forum for that suit, they must always consider enforcement as a
reason for choosing a particular judicial forum. This issue of enforcement is
usually not as troublesome when parties deal with arbitration. Arbitration en-
forcement treaties are more prolific throughout the international community
than are agreements based solely on traditional litigation. The New York Con-
vention60 and the Panama Convention are two of these agreements to which
the United States and many other nations are signatories.62 Treaties like these
carry provisions that have empowered parties to utilize the courts of signatory
nations to enforce arbitral awards.
The rise in reciprocity and comity in the international community re-
garding arbitral award enforcement has become one of the chief benefits for
parties to avoid litigation.6 3 Because countries are more willing to enforce arbi-
tral awards based on merit, procedural law has begun to become more centrally
important to arbitration enforcement in signatory countries. 6 4 Although coun-
tries that sign these arbitration agreements are willing to enforce foreign awards,
58 Id. at 305 (citing ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE
OF LAWYERS, 861 (3d ed. 2002)).
5 Knull & Rubins, supra note 45, at 533 ("[B]ecause it can be problematic to enforce a court
judgment across national borders, arbitration is frequently the only way a prevailing party to an
international proceeding can actually compel payment after the resolution process is complete.").
60 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
61 See Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 301 et.
seq. (2006).
62 See supra note 24 and accompanying text; Thomas H. Oehmke, International Laws and
Treaties-Inter-American Convention, 2 Com. ARB. §41:6 (2010). Both sources provide a very
strong analysis of how these two conventions affect the recognition of arbitral awards and how
they can and cannot be enforced in foreign jurisdictions. These sources also describe how the two
conventions work together and all the nations that are signatories.
63 BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 1, at 136.
6 Wolf, supra note 5, at 305.
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most still wish to retain some means to protect against abuses. Procedural law
has grown not simply for governing the validity of these awards, but more im-
portantly the grounds for setting aside these awards if abuse does occur.65
5. Honor Parties' Intentions
Typically, parties in arbitration have bargained for and agreed upon it as
the means to resolve their dispute. It would seem counterintuitive to not defer to
arbitration then, based on its notion as a contractual construct to honor the par-
ties' intentions. 66 There are two aspects of this advantage of arbitration that can
be identified as either a direct result of arbitration or indirectly stemming from
its use. First, arbitration is based on freedom of contract. When parties agree to
arbitrate, it is no different than another term agreed to in a contract.67 Even in
industries that require arbitration for any disputes, it is a free choice to enter into
that industry.68
Secondly, courts will point to public policy supporting resolution of
disputes that do not require public judicial aid. In many countries the public
court dockets and trial schedules are backlogged and litigation can take many
years from beginning to end. Therefore, if a judge has an opportunity to send
some cases elsewhere, when the disputing parties have made declarations of an
intention to use arbitration but had never formally agreed, then that judge will
almost always honor those parties' intentions. This encouragement of arbitra-
tion, in situations such as these, "reflects an international preference that the
intention of the parties, as evidenced by their contractual obligations, should be
preeminent."69
C. Disadvantages
Arbitration is not a perfect system. Even those proponents of arbitration
find problems and cannot be totally uncritical. International arbitration has risen
to its current state of prominence because of many parties' reluctance to submit
65 Id.; see also Pippa Read, Delocalization ofInternational Commercial Arbitration: Its Relev-
ance in the New Millennium, 10 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 177 (1999) (discussing the delocalization of
international arbitration, specifically the effect of procedural law on parties to arbitration and
possible theories for avoiding the procedural law of the forum state).
6 Wolf, supra note 5, at 305 (quoting ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS, 757 (3d ed. 2002) ("[O]ne common rationale for deference
to arbitration is that the parties have bargained for the judgment of an arbitrator, rather than a
court, to resolve their disputes and that this bargain, once made, should be respected.")).
67 Id. at 306.
68 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatua-
tion and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1381 (1996) (discussing even where, as in the
securities industry, all disputes are sent to arbitration-the customer has willingly agreed to arbi-
trate his disputes as part of the cost of gaining access to the securities industry).
69 Wolf, supra note 5, at 306.
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their dispute to a foreign jurisdiction's court system. 70 However, even with its
popularity, in many cases arbitration's problems arise from the same attributes
that are cited as beneficial qualities.71 This section will discuss how finality can
act as a deterrent, accuracy is sometimes lost for efficiency, arbitral expertise
may sacrifice neutrality, and the problems that multi-party disputes pose to-
wards international arbitration.
1. Finality as a Deterrent
Finality is usually cited as one of the strongest advantages of arbitration,
but it also can act as a deterrent to selecting arbitration. There are instances
where a party whose amount in dispute may be so large or significant that they
become less interested in finality and more reluctant to chance a decision with-
out exercising every possible legal mechanism. 72 If parties enter into arbitration,
the decision is typically binding, and there is no appellate review, unless agreed
upon in advance. Some courts have procedures in place that will set aside arbi-
tral awards for blatant or inconceivable decisions,73 but a majority of national
courts, through agreement to arbitration treaties, will take the decisions as valid
and enforce the judgments.
As growth continues throughout the international community and the
value of transactions are on the rise, international businesses engage in a high
stakes gamble every time they use arbitration. 74 Evidence shows that intema-
tional arbitration is losing ground to traditional litigation of disputes over very
large sums of money. 75 This could be due to the lack of a "back-up" mechanism
following the arbitral award.
Another aspect of finality that is emphasized as an advantage of interna-
tional arbitration is to protect the underlying commercial relationship. However,
with the rise of technology, more and more small companies have the opportuni-
ty to engage in international business with another foreign party and they may
only enter into a single transaction. These parties have no interest in protecting a
future business relationship and are more concerned with making certain this
70 Id.
71 Nelson, supra note 7, at 200.
72 Wolf, supra note 5, at 307.
7 See, e.g., William W. Park et al., International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 37 INT'L L.
445 (2003). In U.S. federal court, there exists a two-prong test to set aside arbitral awards for
"manifest disregard of the law." First, an objective element requires inquiry into whether the
relevant law was "well-defined, explicit and clearly applicable." Second, a subjective component
of the test involves examination of whether the arbitrator intentionally ignored the law. Id. at 445,
446. Tests such as these tend to be in addition to the procedural defenses granted under the New
York Convention.
74 Wolf, supra note 5, at 307.
7 Knull & Rubins, supra note 45, at 532 ("In a recent survey of 606 corporate lawyers from
America's largest corporations, 54.3% of those who chose not to opt for arbitration said that
choice was made largely because arbitration awards are so difficult to appeal.").
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decision is correct. Therefore, these parties may avoid arbitration in order to
avoid an "end-game" scenario. Without a more common form of appellate re-
76view, a chilling effect will take place on the use of international arbitration.
2. Accuracy Sacrificed for Efficiency
The arbitral process can trade the interests of accuracy and justice for
that of efficiency.7 7 Accuracy is a time consuming process and when someone
seeks a more efficient process, accuracy can sometimes be lost. For example,
the narrower discovery permitted in arbitration may prevent arbitrators from
being able to compel the production of documents or presentation of wit-
nesses.78 This restriction many times can hinder fact development and lead to
unjustified results from the arbitrator. 79 Although this efficient process ends
disputes, it can harm the other aspects of dispute resolution. The settlement of
conflict achieves peace between the parties, but this peace is obtained at the
expense of another significant purpose of adjudication,80 that being the explana-
tion of a community's rules and laws."
A traditional court system provides essentially two types of service. 8 2
One is dispute resolution through determining whether a rule has been violated,
and the other is rule formulation through creating rules of law as a byproduct to
the dispute resolution process.83 The inherent tradeoff to alternative dispute res-
olution is that what parties gain in efficiency may be outweighed by societal
loss.8 4 Arbitration can be argued as good for society because it is an attempt to
honor the intentions of disputing parties by allowing them to resolve their dis-
pute in whichever manner they choose. The parties after all have agreed to live
by the decision of the arbitrator and this decision can then easily be coined a
"just" result.85 Also, it helps to conserve judicial resources as arbitration takes
many disputes that may not require formal judicial process to reach a result.
86
Nonetheless, the parties' chosen process may not necessarily achieve justice.
On the other hand, society also has an interest in seeing accurate results
to a dispute based on the merits of a case. The broad discovery tools and proce-
76 Wolf, supra note 5, at 307.
n Id. at 308.
78 Nelson, supra note 7, at 203.
79 Id
80 Wolf, supra note 5, at 308-09.
81 Id at 309 ("Courts not only aim to achieve peace between warring parties, but also to expli-
cate and give force to the community's values, as they are embodied in their laws.").
82
83 Id
84 Id at 308.
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dures that are employed by traditional litigation, although costly and time con-
suming, tend to lead to the development of all the relevant facts and issues.
By the use of thorough discovery tools, justice is served by a case being decided
based upon merit and not simply being disposed of quickly in order to move
forward with business. The second societal interest that is lost by the use of arbi-
tration procedures is the lack of precedent that follows arbitral decisions."
Many systems of law depend on court opinions and outcomes to not only guide
the courts in future disputes, but also to form rules in order to "impose order
where uncertainty would otherwise chill people's behavior."8 9 Therefore, arbi-
tration can deprive courts of the opportunity to interpret a community's values
and laws.90
The final product of an attempt at a more efficient process is the prob-
lem of parallel proceedings. Parallel proceedings are sometimes considered in-
evitable when dealing with international dispute settlement. 91 There are various
problems that accompany the parallel proceedings 92 that necessarily follow any
disputes in the international arena. Besides the obviously higher legal costs and
time requirements of these proceedings, if a party attempts to enforce a judg-
ment in one jurisdiction while proceedings are pending in another, the party may
be handicapped from enforcing its legal right. 9 3 The costs and time that go along
with these parallel proceedings drastically counteract the efficiency of ending a
dispute through arbitration.
3. Expertise Hinders Neutrality
Arbiter expertise is neither a requirement nor an attribute that is univer-
sally embraced in the arbitration process. There are many benefits from an arbi-
trator that has a strong background and knowledge of the subject matter of the
dispute. However, this knowledge can be accompanied by predisposition and
preconceptions which may lead to arbiter bias. 94 Even very educated individu-
als, who swear to remain neutral, will bring their opinions and prejudices into
dispute resolution. In addition, many times arbitrators with subject matter exper-
8 Id. at 308.
88 Id. at 309.
8 Id.
90 Id. This would apply mostly in countries that use a common law system that gives tremend-
ous weight to precedent. It would seem that this would be less of a disadvantage in a civil law
system that puts less value on court precedent.
91 See Nadine Balkanyi-Nordmann, The Perils of Parallel Proceedings: Is an Arbitration
Award Enforceable if the Same Case is Pending Elsewhere?, 56 DisP. RESOL. J. 20, 21 (2002).
92 A "parallel proceeding," for the purposes of this article, is either litigation or arbitration
involving the same parties and causes of action but pending in the states of different jurisdictions.
Id.
9 Id.
94 Wolf, supra note 5, at 310-11.
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tise will be reused within an industry.95 Due to this practice, some arbitrators
may have an incentive to favor their industry in order to obtain future employ-
ment.96
4. Multi-Party Disputes
Generally, the current system of international arbitration lacks the ap-
propriate mechanism to deal with more than a two-party dispute.97 The growth
of international business and global interdependence has led to a higher level of
transactions between multiple parties. For example, construction contracts
present many difficulties, as they typically involve many parties." Most in-
stances, there are many subcontractors, employees, banks, insurers, and so on.99
Any disputes that are to arise from these transactions will likely involve several
of the parties, as the disputants attempt to pass responsibility to the others. 00
Certain problems come about where several parties sign a single contract, which
provides for selection of arbitrators by the parties. This leads to problems be-
cause many of the model sets of arbitration rules' 01 provide for the means of
selection by two disputants, but not three or more.10 2 The problems that would
arise from six parties that all want to appoint their own arbitrator are readily
apparent. Not only would these parties not be able to agree upon an arbitral pan-
el, but then once the proceedings began the thought of six arbitrators agreeing
on how to rule on a dispute between six different parties, from which each arbi-
trator was appointed, tends to boggle the mind.
D. Summary ofAttributes for Arbitration
For better or worse, arbitration is the most used form of international al-
ternative dispute resolution. As with most tools of dispute resolution, parties
have to use a process of weighing pros and cons when deciding whether to en-
95 Id. at 312.
96 Id.




101 For example, the International Chamber of Commerce's rules provide that the disputees will
nominate arbitrators but may not have more than three arbitrators on a panel. INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 8 (2010), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rulesarbenglish.pdf. Also, the
London Court of International Arbitration's rules of arbitration provide that when there are three
or more parties to a dispute, if the parties cannot divide between claimant and respondent, then the
Court will disregard nominations for arbitrators and appoint them by itself. LCIA, ARBITRATION
RULES, art. 8.1 (1998), available at
http://www.lcia.org/DisputeResolutionServices/LCIAArbitrationRules.aspx.
102 Nelson, supra note 7, at 200.
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gage in arbitration. Arbitration could be the best possible means to end a dispute
for some parties, while others may prefer traditional litigation for a host of rea-
sons. Regardless, any party that chooses to pursue arbitration will, without a
doubt, be employing the most common and easy to use form of alternative dis-
pute resolution.
III. CASE STUDY: KARAHA BODAS CO., L.L.C. V. PER USAHAAN PERTAMBANGAN
MINYAK DAN GAS BuMI NEGARA
International arbitration is generally accepted as being the primary al-
ternative to traditional litigation because it offers many advantages when ap-
plied to commercial trade. However, the purpose of this case study will be to
determine if general arbitration practices and procedures, as applied to the trade
and development of natural resources, will be equally advantageous. The analy-
sis will be focused on arbitration generally, but the importance and utility of an
analysis of this case is premised on it as being for the development and trade of
natural resources. The result of this case study will show the difficulties that
generalized arbitration has with a dispute involving natural resources trade and
development. Following this case study, there will be a discussion identifying
the specific problems that this area of trade poses and means to alter arbitration
in order to be more effective.
There are multiple reasons for choosing this particular case. One reason
is the nature of the product being developed and traded. Geothermal energy has
a great likelihood for tremendous value based upon its potential for energy pro-
duction as well as its renewable nature.103 Additionally, there will likely be
more cases that follow a similar fact pattern as this over the next several years.
As energy use continues to grow and demand for a more efficient and sustaina-
ble means to produce energy grow along with it, more disputes similar to this
will arise. In order to better resolve these disputes a harder focus must be taken
on finding a solution to the unique problems that natural resource trade and de-
velopment create. This should be kept in mind while reading the next section.
A. Background Facts and Procedural Posture
To begin, it is important to meet the parties. Karaha Bodas Company,
L.L.C. ("KBC") is a privately owned power development company that is based
out of the Cayman Islands. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara ("Pertamina") is a power company that is wholly owned by the Indone-
103 Professor Nafi Toksoz, a professor of geophysics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
says that "[gleothermal energy could play an important role in our national energy picture as a
non-carbon-based energy source." Further, he comments that "[i]t's a very large resource and has
the potential to be a significant contributor to the energy needs of this county." Ken Silverstein,
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sian government. KBC explores and develops geothermal energy sources and
builds electric generating stations using geothermal sources. Pertamina is an oil,
gas, and geothermal energy company. In November 1994, KBC signed two con-
tracts to produce electricity from geothermal sources in Indonesia. ' Under the
Joint Operation Contract ("JOC") and the Energy Sales Contract ("ESC"), KBC
was to develop the geothermal energy sources, and Pertamina was to manage
the project and sell the produced electricity to PLN. 05 Both contracts contained
almost identical arbitration clauses, which required the parties to arbitrate any
disputes in Switzerland under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL").10 6 Work had begun
on the project, and then on September 20, 1997, the government of Indonesia
temporarily suspended the project because of the country's financial crisis. 0 7
Work on the project was temporarily restored on November 1, 1997.108 Howev-
er, the Indonesian government indefinitely suspended the project on January 10,
1998.109
On February 10, 1998, KBC notified Pertamina that the government's
indefinite suspension constituted an event of "force majeure" under the ESC and
104 Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d
274, 282 (5th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Fifth Circuit Confirmation Opinion].
105 Id. PLN is an electric utility owned by the Indonesian government but was dismissed from
the action. Id. at 282 n.6.
106 Id. at 282. Article 13.2(a) of the JOC and Section 8.2(a) of the ESC's arbitration provision
both provide for any disputes between the parties to be resolved through the use of an arbitral
tribunal and allow for appointment of arbitrators by the parties. Id. at 282-83 n.7. Further, both
contracts contained the following language:
The award rendered in any arbitration commenced hereunder shall be final
and binding upon the Parties and judgment thereon may be entered in any
court having jurisdiction for its enforcement. The Parties hereby renounce
their right to appeal from the decision of the arbitral panel and agree that in
accordance with Section 641 of the Indonesian Code of Civil Procedure [nei-
ther] Party shall appeal to any court from the arbitral panel and accordingly
the Parties hereby waive the applicability of [certain Indonesian laws]. In ad-
dition, the Parties agree that [neither] Party shall have any right to commence
or maintain any suit or legal proceeding concerning a [dispute hereunder until
the] dispute has been determined in accordance with the arbitration procedure
provided for herein and then only to enforce or facilitate the execution of the
award rendered in such arbitration.
Id. (emphasis added).
107 Fifth Circuit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 104, at 283.
108 Karaha Bodas Co. v. Persusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 190 F.
Supp. 2d 936, 940 (S.D. Tex. 2001) [hereinafter Texas Confirmation Opinion].
109 Fifth Circuit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 104, at 283. The reasons behind the Indone-
sian government's suspension of the project and eventual termination coincided with a change of
leadership in Indonesia. The country during this time was experiencing intense political chal-
lenges and economic hardship. For a good discussion and excellent analysis of these problems, see
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JOC contracts.o KBC initiated arbitration proceedings shortly thereafter on
April 30, 1998."' As stated in the contracts, KBC went ahead and appointed an
arbitrator and awaited Pertamina's response and appointment of an arbitrator of
its own. After thirty days had past, following commencement of arbitration pro-
ceedings, by a letter dated June 2, 1998, KBC notified the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") of Pertamina's inaction and
requested the appointment of a second arbitrator pursuant to the appointment
provision of the contracts. 1 12 The ICSID questioned KBC's unilateral appoint-
ment of an arbitrator but ultimately expressed its intent to grant KBC's request
for appointment in a letter dated June 29, 1998, that was addressed to all par-
ties. 113 It was at this point that ICSID appointed an arbitrator because of Perta-
mina's lack of response.1 14 From there, as specified in the JOC and ESC, the
two appointed arbitrators then selected a third arbitrator to be the chairman of
the panel.115
This newly formed tribunal heard some preliminary issues on Novem-
ber 19, 1998.116 Following this hearing, Pertamina submitted a memorial con-
tending KBC had improperly consolidated claims, and the tribunal was impro-
perly constituted because it was a multi-party dispute and that KBC failed to
honor the arbiter nomination procedures.117 A hearing was held on this matter
on May 31, 1999.11' On October 4, 1999, the tribunal issued a preliminary
award, which held the tribunal was properly constituted, the claims were proper-
ly consolidated, and the Indonesian government was not a party.119 KBC then
filed its revised Statement of Claim on November 24, 1999.120 Pertamina then
received a number of time extensions before filing its response on April 7,
2000.121 In turn, KBC filed a rebuttal to that response in May 2000.122 Pertamina
made a request for further continuance and discovery, which was denied later in
the same month. 123
110 Fifth Circuit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 104, at 283.
HI Id.
112 Texas Confirmation Opinion, supra note 108, at 940-41.
113 Id. at 941.
114 Fifih Circuit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 104, at 283.
115 Id.





121 Id. at 941-42.
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It was at this point that a hearing on the merits of the case was sche-
duled to begin at some point in June.12 4 The hearing commenced on June 19th
and ended on June 23rd.125 The transcript that resulted from the hearing ended
up being over 800 pages, and it included extensive argument and live testimony
from several witnesses.126 After considering the evidence presented, the tribunal
issued its final award on December 18, 2000.127 The tribunal held that Pertamina
had violated both the JOC and ESC, and awarded KBC damages for money
spent on the project and lost profits.128 Pertamina appealed the award to the Su-
preme Court of Switzerland in February 2001, and while that appeal was pend-
ing, KBC began to initiate enforcement proceedings across the globe.12 9
After KBC was given judgment from the arbitral award, its attorneys
began to enforce the judgment in any state that had assets that could be attached.
It is at this point where multiple parallel proceedings were engaged, both do-
mestic to the United States and in other foreign jurisdictions. The initial suit in
the United States was in the Southern District of Texas. The Texas District
Court slowed its proceedings in deference to Pertamina's request that the Swiss
Supreme Court would first be allowed to decide whether to annul the award on
appeal.13 0 In April 2001, the Swiss Supreme Court denied Pertamina's claim
because of certain untimely payment of costs.' 3 ' Pertamina moved for reconsi-
deration, which was again dismissed in August 2001.132 The Texas District
Court, in December 2001, following notice of the Swiss Court's decision, de-
cided to enforce the arbitral award and rejected all of Pertamina's challenges.133
Pertamina appealed and the decision was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 134
At the same time as this litigation, there were several other proceedings
being pursued. After the Swiss Supreme Court denied Pertamina's request to
annul the award, Pertamina filed suit in Indonesia seeking annulment by its
courts.135 In August 2002, the Indonesian court ordered annulment of the arbitral
124 Id
125 Texas Confirmation Opinion, supra note 108, at 942.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Fifth Circuit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 104, at 285. The tribunal awarded KBC
$111.1 million, the amount KBC had expended on the project, and $150 million for lost profits.







134 Id at 310.
13s Id at 285.
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award.' 36 Meanwhile, at the same time as Pertamina's annulment suit was pend-
ing in the Indonesian court, KBC filed another suit in the Texas District Court to
enjoin Pertamina from pursuing action to annul the award in Indonesia.137 KBC
was seeking an anti-suit injunction that would protect the arbitral award from
annulment by the Indonesian court as well as protection from annulment by
other foreign courts.'38 The Texas District Court granted the injunction in April
2002.139 However, Pertamina appealed and the Fifth Circuit held that the Dis-
trict Court could not issue the injunction because it was outside the duties of a
court underneath the New York Convention. 140 Therefore, it reversed the Dis-
trict Court's decision in June 2003.141
In addition to the Texas and Fifth Circuit litigation taking place, there
were multiple attempts to enforce the award in other areas. KBC attempted to
register its judgment, as confirmed by the Texas District Court, in New York,
Delaware, 14 2 and California. 14 3 In February 2002, KBC presented the judgment
to the Southern District of New York for enforcement, to which the court issued
a writ of execution "author[izing KBC] to execute upon any property of Perta-
mina within this jurisdiction in satisfaction of the outstanding final judgment,
amounting, to date, in total to the sum of $261,166,654.92 plus interest." 144
However, a dispute arose as to which bank accounts could be executed upon by
KBC. That dispute went to the Second Circuit which affirmed the District
Court, ordering that KBC could attach to a portion of the disputed funds, but not
the entire amount in the accounts. 14 5 More litigation followed, primarily revolv-
ing around the disputed funds and bank accounts.14 6
As this issue was being resolved, Pertamina suspected fraud by KBC in
its arbitral award, and brought an independent action in the Cayman Islands.147
In response, KBC brought an anti-suit injunction, similar to the one brought in
136 Id. at 285-86.
137 Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 264 F.
Supp. 2d 470 (S.D. Tex. 2002) [hereinafter Texas Injunction Opinion].
138 Id. at 474-75.
139 Id. at 483.
140 Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d
357, 374 (5th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Fifth Circuit Injunction Opinion].
141 Id
142 See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Virginia Indonesia Co., BP Muriah Ltd., 57 F. App'x. 535 (3rd
Cir. 2003).
143 Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 313 F.3d
70, 77 (2nd Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Second Circuit Confirmation Opinion].
14 Id. at 77-78.
145 Id. at 92-93.
146 See, e.g., Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara,
305 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
147 Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 500 F.3d
111, 117 (2nd Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Second Circuit Injunction Opinion].
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Texas earlier, to enjoin Pertamina from suing KBC over the award execution
and enforcement.148 The New York District Court stated that KBC was entitled
to an injunction prohibiting Pertamina from applying to the Cayman Islands
court or other foreign courts restricting the use of arbitral award.14 9 The Second
Circuit affirmed the District Court's opinion and injunction, modifying it only
slightly.150 Finally, as of now, it appears that the litigation may have ceased in
the United States as the Supreme Court denied Pertamina's petition for certiorari
in June 2008.t5t
Throughout the above timeline of award enforcement litigation taking
place in the domestic United States, there were other venues that KBC at-
tempted to enforce its arbitral award. KBC filed suit to enforce in Hong Kong,
Canada, and Singapore. In March 2003, the Hong Kong High Court granted
KBC's application to register the award and denied Pertamina's attempt to have
it set aside.152 An appeal was partially heard in December 2003, but adjourned
to be reheard in February 2006. 153 However, the award was for a little under
$900,000.154 As for Singapore, in March 2002, the High Court of Singapore
granted KBC's application to register the award as well.'5 5 However, in late
January 2006, Pertamina informed the Singapore court of its fraud allegations of
KBC.156 KBC made various applications to the court in an attempt to defer liti-
gation until the termination of proceedings in the United States, but the court
denied KBC's applications.'57 Eventually, KBC voluntarily dismissed its action
in Singapore. 58 Lastly, in December 2004, a Canadian court gave judgment to
KBC and confirmed the award. 5 9
Collection following enforcement of judgments was an entirely differ-
ent story. Even though KBC was able to have enforcement of judgments in
these different states or nations, actually attaching to assets and collecting upon
those judgments was difficult. As discussed above, in New York there was an
148 Id.atl17-18
149 Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 465 F.
Supp. 2d 283, 300-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter New York Injunction Opinion].
150 Second Circuit Injunction Opinion, supra note 147, at 130. The modification was only to
clarify that this injunction does not bar any other enforcement proceedings in other nations or any
actions that would be inconsistent with the New York Convention.
151 PT Pertamina v. Karaha Bodas Co., 554 U.S. 929 (2008).
152 New York Injunction Opinion, supra note 149, at 286.






1 Id. at 286.
159 Id. But, at the time of the New York Injunction Opinion's publication, Pertamina's appeal of
that judgment was still pending.
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entire series of litigation solely to determine the portion of money in certain
bank accounts that could be attached.16 0 Finally, the New York District Court
asked Pertamina if their petition for certiorari was denied to the Supreme Court,
would they consent to pay the judgment against it.' 6 1 Pertamina stated that if
certiorari was denied, it would "not object before this Court to the payment of
the judgment." 62 In October 2006, almost all of the $319 million payment was
turned over to KBC for distribution to its shareholders.16 3 However, this money
did not make it to KBC at this time. The District Court stayed the assets pending
the appeal to the Second Circuit by Pertamina.16 4 The Second Circuit then
granted KBC's motion to lift the stay on February 13, 2007.165 The Supreme
Court, on February 15, denied Pertamina's motion for an emergency stay to
override the grant by the Second Circuit.16 6 It was not until this point when KBC
was finally able to satisfy the majority of its judgment against Pertamina.
B. Analysis
Arbitration did not work in the dispute between KBC and Pertamina.
The advantages that arbitration is supposed to provide were inadequate or prob-
lematic in this contract dispute. Again, as discussed in detail above, the advan-
tages of arbitration are supposed to be as follows: its efficiency; its finality; the
option for parties to choose an arbitrator with subject matter expertise; the rela-
tive ease with which international arbitral awards are enforced, compared to
international litigation awards; and its institutional goal, as a contractual con-
struct, to best honor the parties' intentions.167 Each of these cited advantages
failed in its application in the dispute. Although there is no way to predict how
this case would have gone if the parties would have, from the beginning, used
traditional litigation, it does not seem it could have been any worse.
1. An Inefficient Result
Efficiency is often given credit as being the primary advantage of arbi-
tration. This dispute was anything but efficient. The actual arbitration from ini-
tial proceedings to final award was not by itself overly inefficient. The entire
process from KBC's initial notice of arbitration to the final award by the panel
160 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
161 New York Injunction Opinion, supra note 149, at 288.
162 Id.
163 Second Circuit Injunction Opinion, supra note 147, at 117. A smaller portion of the funds
was not turned over until November. Id. at 117 n.6.
164 Id. at 18.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 See supra Part II.B. and accompanying text.
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was only a little more than two years. This process would appear to be much
quicker than if the parties had taken their dispute to a national court system.
However, receiving judgment is only half the battle. The events that took place
during and after judgment are the source of the problems and inefficiencies that
accompany arbitration as a form of dispute resolution.
The problems here began before the arbitration hearing had started. Al-
though two years does not appear to be a long period of time, this time period
could have been much shorter had it not been for the constant extensions that
the parties were being given for the filing of their documents. The flexibility of
arbitration actually harmed the efficiency of the process. Both KBC and Perta-
mina were given a series of time extensions, prior to the hearing, for filing of the
Revised Statement of Claim and the response to it. The allowable flexibility,
which may not have been granted in traditional litigation, extended the date of
the hearing much later than it could have been, which led to an inefficient result.
Next, the arbitration hearing itself caused problems. There was a huge
amount of evidence produced at the hearing that amounted to over 800 pages for
its transcript. Both parties had significant live and written testimony submitted,
which helped account for the hearing taking four days. The fact that the Second
Circuit and the District Court made note of the record being very large should
serve as an indicator that the arbitration produced a significant amount of evi-
dence. Usually, because of the limited discovery and brevity by which the arbi-
trators allow for evidence production, the hearing focuses on key issues and
stresses the importance of a narrow scope for the case to be heard. The goal is
for increased efficiency in the hearing process. The hearing that took place here
further fed into the overall inefficiency because of the breadth by which evi-
dence was taken and heard by the arbitral panel.
Further, the arbitration was not cost efficient. The costs that the parties
in this dispute must have incurred must have been staggering. One can only
imagine the costs that two adverse parties must expend in the course of a dis-
pute, of this magnitude, that spanned over a decade. The initial arbitration pro-
ceedings began in April 1998 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in June
2008. Even though collection efforts had begun and been enforced in certain
jurisdictions, it was not until the denial by the Supreme Court that the litigation
may have ended in the United States.' 68 The legal fees that the parties must have
sustained would have been tremendous based solely on the domestic litigation.
In addition to attorney fees and court costs, the travel expenses by these
parties must have also been enormous. It would be necessary that certain wit-
nesses and attorneys would need to travel to the different courts that the parties
were engaged in, in order to testify or advocate effectively. These locations
ranged from New York to Singapore and everywhere in between. The argument
168 This does not mean that there may not be continuing litigation in foreign jurisdictions across
the globe. It can only be said at this point, that at the time of publication of this article, there is no
current ongoing litigation in the United States.
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that arbitration is more cost efficient would appear to be a very weak one as
shown in this dispute.
A further point to mention that shows a lack of efficiency by the use of
arbitration here was the amount of parallel proceedings that took place while
KBC was trying to enforce the judgment. There are multiple instances of further
court proceedings that hampered the progress of other courts in making deci-
sions about enforcement of the arbitral award. One example is the initial Texas
District Court slowing all proceedings pending the outcome of Swiss Supreme
Court's review of the arbitral award. Another is the same Texas District Court
issuing an anti-suit injunction based upon an annulment proceeding in Indonesia
by Pertamina. This proceeding is almost identical, but slightly different, to the
one by the New York District Court that issued an anti-suit injunction a few
years later for a lawsuit in the Cayman Islands. All of these either slowed pro-
ceedings or added additional litigation based exclusively upon the initiation of
parallel litigation elsewhere. These were only a few of the many instances that
occurred during this dispute that led to a higher level of inefficiency in the over-
all arbitral process. Arbitration in this dispute lacked the efficiency that is re-
quired for it to be a viable alternative to traditional litigation.
2. The Never-Ending Story
Finality is regarded as another attribute of arbitration that allows it be
viewed as advantageous to litigation. In this dispute, there was no degree of
finality to be found. Pertamina was constantly appealing all judgments and
fighting each court order. It seemed as though many times there was almost no
chance of having the court's decision overturned, but Pertamina fought it re-
gardless of its chances. Any opportunity for these parties to get past this prob-
lem and attempt to reestablish a profitable business was impossible. This is due
primarily to one reason: the size of the award. It was so great that the loser of
the judgment would be too far harmed to proceed with further business with the
other collecting party. Also, the nature of the claim was based completely on a
one time construction job for the development of the geothermal energy plant.
This would not have been an ongoing contract between the parties, but was li-
mited to the building of the power plant to harness the resource that would be
managed by Pertamina. For this reason, the parties had less interest in moving
past this problem and were more focused on making sure this decision was cor-
rectly made.
The privacy aspect of finality was also lost by the use of arbitration in
the dispute. Because of the numerous motions, briefs, and appeals, more and
more facts were developed in the case.169 No secrets of the trade were disclosed
or other similar documentation, but through this continuing litigation it would
be quite obvious to competitors and any members of the interested public that
169 See supra Part II.A. and accompanying text. As these facts, for the most part, would not
have been found without the litigation that followed the arbitral award.
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there was a dispute between the parties. This may not have had any real relevant
impact on the parties, but this advantage of arbitration was yet another that was
not found in this dispute.
3. Arbiter Panel Weakness
Arbitral expertise is recognized as a staple to any arbitration panel. It is
very common for legal and technical experts to compose the panel that hears the
disputes by the parties. It is unclear whether the arbitrators in this dispute had
any technical background in the area of geothermal energy development. It ap-
pears that they must have had some experience in international arbitration prior
to their appointment.17 0 But, the hearing must have included some very technical
elements that would have needed explanation, if not translation. The facts indi-
cate that there were at least seven live witnesses and many written submissions
by witnesses as well.' 7 1 The facts do not state if these were experts or lay wit-
nesses, but it seems evident from the Texas District Court's extensive use of
experts, that there must have been some technical expertise required to under-
stand the problems of this dispute. There were a significant number of opinions
rendered to the arbitration panel to help it understand the problem and reach an
educated conclusion.17 2 Of these experts, there were many non-legal experts,
which included a public accountant,' 73 a geologist,'74 and a couple engineers.' 75
The use of these experts creates an inference that the panel needed assistance in
rendering an opinion in a field of certain complexity. Therefore, it would appear
that there was a lack of arbitral expertise by the panel in regards to the technical
area involved here. The lack of a panel with expertise eliminates one of the ad-
170 This assertion is based solely upon the positions listed with the names of the arbitrators.
KBC appointed Professor Piero Bernardini, who was at the time Vice-Chairman of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce's International Court of Arbitration and Member of the London
Court of International Arbitration. Texas Confirmation Opinion, supra note 108, at 940 n.2. The
ICSID appointed Dr. Ahmed El-Kosheri, another Vice-Chairman of the International Chamber of
Commerce's International Court of Arbitration. Id. at 941 n.3. These two arbitrators, as required
by the contract, then appointed Mr. Yves Derains, who was the former Secretary General of the
International Chamber of Commerce, as Chairman of the panel. Fifth Circuit Confirmation Opi-
nion, supra note 104, at 283.
171 Texas Confirmation Opinion, supra note 108, at 942.
172 Id. at 936. This conclusion is reached because of the list of expert opinions listed following
the court's opinion. These opinions would most likely have been filed along with other documents
that went before the court by the two parties to the suit.
'7 See Expert Report and Affidavit, Texas Confirmation Opinion, 190 F. Supp. 2d 936 (S.D.
Tex. 2001) (No. 01-CV-0634), 2000 WL 35300414.
174 See Rebuttal Witness Statement, Texas Confirmation Opinion, 190 F. Supp. 2d 936 (S.D.
Tex. 2001) (No. 01-CV-0634), 2001 WL 35199777.
17 See Expert Report and Affidavit, Texas Confirmation Opinion, 190 F. Supp. 2d 936 (S.D.
Tex. 2001) (No. 01-CV-0634), 2000 WL 35057559; Expert Report and Affidavit, Texas Confir-
mation Opinion, 190 F. Supp. 2d 936 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (No. 01-CV-0634), 2000 WL 35152905.
This list is not extensive; there were further opinions.
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vantages that arbitration is supposed to possess. Without this expertise, these
arbitrators are not much better off than a traditional judge and a further drag on
efficiency is created.
4. Inadequate Enforcement
Enforcement is considered a strong advantage in international arbitra-
tion over that of traditional litigation. There is a major distinction between re-
ceiving a judgment and being able to enforce that judgment in a jurisdiction
where assets can be attached. This distinction is brought to the forefront in in-
ternational cases when enforceability is always an issue. This dispute highlights
this distinction as KBC received judgment relatively early in the process, but
was not able to enforce the judgment and attach assets until many years later.
The judgment by the arbitral panel was awarded in December 2000. Over the
next seven years, KBC attempted and was successful in enforcing the award in
various jurisdictions in the United States and abroad. However, it was not until
2007 when KBC was finally able to collect upon its judgment.
The disconnect between judgment and enforcement is a problem that
arbitration was supposed to minimize. Arbitration enforcement treaties 76were
an attempt to close the time and legal gaps between receiving a judgment and
enforcing it in a jurisdiction of a signatory country. Here, the United States is a
signatory to the New York Convention, under which KBC was attempting to
enforce the award. 1" However, the problem that was supposed to be limited by
the treaty still occurred. Seven years is hardly a quick turn around from judg-
ment to enforcement and collection. Although seven years may not seem ex-
treme for many settings, it is for a method of dispute resolution that claims to be
a quicker process that allows for simpler enforcement. The multiple proceedings
and constant appeals that took place during this dispute did not meet the goals of
speedy enforcement, which is argued as an advantage of arbitration.
5. Neglecting Party Intentions
Finally, arbitration in this dispute did not best honor the parties' inten-
tions. At first glance, it would seem that this advantage of arbitration was found
in this dispute. The parties had contracted for an arbitration clause, and when a
problem arose, the parties both voluntarily submitted to that arbitration. Howev-
er, a closer reading of the contract language will actually show otherwise. Not
only did the parties agree to arbitrate any disputes, but they also agreed to not
appeal the final order of the arbitral decision. The contract language stated that
the award would be final and binding on the parties. This language was not fol-
lowed as Pertamina appealed and filed annulment proceedings in order to avoid
176 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
177 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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the arbitral judgment. The same reasoning that argues that the parties' intentions
were met for having arbitration also is used to show that their intentions were
not met because the contract stated that the arbitral award would be final and
clearly it was not.
Honoring the parties' intentions is an aspect of arbitration that gives it a
certain level of quality over traditional litigation. Most courts and people believe
that if something is voluntarily entered into and agreed upon, then there is a
higher level of justice achieved by its result rather than forcing parties to engage
in something. Without honoring the intentions of the parties through enforcing
the contract how it was written, and agreed upon, then arbitration loses a prima-
ry principle of its wide acceptance. The partial reading of the contract that was
done here does not show that Pertamina violated the arbitration clause by ignor-
ing its final binding provision. However, if the contract is read as intended, as a
whole, then it states that Pertamina did in fact violate the contract, and the entire
arbitration procedure and subsequent litigation did not honor the parties' inten-
tion of creating a binding process.
C. Case Study Final Thoughts178
KBC and Pertamina entered into a contract with an arbitration clause
with the expectation of certain goals to be achieved through its use. A problem
came up that caused a breach of the contract by Pertamina. As required by the
contract, the parties began arbitration proceedings. Unfortunately, the arbitration
did not work as planned. This is partially the fault of the parties, but also is due
to the inherent problems that natural resource arbitration poses to the traditional
arbitral model. The generalized arbitration procedures that are very effective in
many types of commercial trade disputes do not carry over to instances involv-
ing natural resources trade and development. With this in mind, consider the
following suggestions for improvement to the process.
IV. ARBITRATION PROBLEM AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Before beginning to discuss suggestions to alter the traditional arbitral
model, a discussion must be had as to the essence of the problem and then the
actual difficulties that this problem raises.
178 The KBC/Pertamina dispute is not the only example where parties, engaged in international
energy and natural resources trade, have submitted to arbitration and had poor results. See, e.g.,
Steel Corp. of Philippines v. Int'l Steel Servs., Inc., 354 F. App'x 689 (3d Cir. 2009) (parties trad-
ing in iron ore and steel products that submitted to arbitration ended in multiple appeals); Termo-
Rio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (parties agreed to the construc-
tion and purchase of a power plant, which fell through and was submitted to arbitration; however,
following the arbitral award the parties instituted numerous law suits); Halliburton Energy Servs.,
Inc. v. NL Indus., 618 F. Supp. 2d 614 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (parties engaged in the production and
sale of petroleum byproducts submitted to arbitration and lawsuits followed concerning various
issues of the arbitration).
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A. Government Involvement as a Barrier to Success' 79
The problems that natural resources trade and development pose stem
from the almost certain government involvement by each country that has a
stake in the process. The reasons for the government constantly having a hand in
this form of commercial trade are many, but it would seem to mostly circulate
around the value and scarcity of these resources. The interest by the government
to deal in natural resources would likely come from the rise in demand for ener-
gy. Although this is not a recent phenomenon, that is, that there continues to be
a larger demand of energy each year, it still needs to be noted because it is the
underlying reason for government activity in this field.180
Natural resources, either renewable or non-renewable, have tremendous
value for the ability to produce energy in a variety of forms. Further, their value
comes from either their scarcity in amount, or location. Meaning, that non-
renewable resources will eventually no longer be available for use, and because
of their finite state, their value is high. This is an example of scarcity in amount.
Whereas renewable resources will, if sustainably used, last forever, but their
value comes from the location in which they are found. A renewable resource
may be very clean and have a high capacity factor,' but if it is too costly to
distribute to an area of demand, then its value decreases. Therefore, this is an
example of scarcity by location.
Because of the inherent value that natural resources possess, and also
because of the uniqueness that they typically have in geographic location, a
country possessing these valuable stocks would be foolish not to be interested in
their control. It is due to these considerations that governments wish to pursue
involvement in the trade and development of natural resources.
The government involves itself in natural resources trade and develop-
ment to a much higher degree than in any other commercial trade.182 This is not
to say that the United States government or the government of another nation
does not regulate or attempt to control other forms of commercial trade. None-
theless, it is not a reach to conclude that government is more likely to be either a
party or have a direct stake in the outcome of natural resources trade and devel-
opment disputes. It does not take long after either watching or reading the news
179 Government, or state, involvement in international trade and specifically arbitration is an
issue that not only this author views as important or prevalent. Currently, the International Cham-
ber of Commerce has organized a task force and is conducting an investigation into arbitrations
involving states or state entities to determine whether any additional procedural mechanisms
should apply to these disputes. See International Chamber of Commerce, Task Force on Arbitra-
tion Involving States or State Entities,
http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/arbitration/id32956/index.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
180 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
181 See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REv.
765, 796 n.150 (2008).
182 See id at 792-94.
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that this fact is realized.'83 In the United States, federal, state, and local govern-
ments all attempt to have some form of control or direct input on the final use of
natural resources.184 This could range from federal legislation to local county
ordinances. Either way, these are all means by which the government will assert
some form of control over natural resource trade and development.
In the United States, there is less involvement by the government over
natural resources than in other countries. However, it does not change the fact
that the United States will find a way to be involved. It may go by the name of
environmental protection, national security, export controls and short supply
restrictions, maintenance of national reserves, or the promotion of sustainable
use but in the end these are all ways that the government wishes to assert control
over a valuable commodity. As stated, this is more prevalent overseas where
private property rights are not protected as strongly as in the United States. For-
eign governments may assert, and usually do, more ownership over natural re-
sources based upon a variety of arguments. 8 1
No matter the nation or its government, there are a few common means
by which the government may involve itself in the natural resource commercial
scene. The two most typical would be either by establishing a "state-owned enti-
ty" to do the business of developing the state owned resources or by leasing and
selling off the resources to private companies for their own development. A few
state-owned entities would be Saudia Aramco,' 86 Rosneft,'" Statoil,'88 and Per-
1 The following articles are either situations where the national government is restricting
development or when it engages in commercial trade and development itself See, e.g., Keith
Bradsher, China Seizes Rare Earth Mine Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, at BI, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/21/business/global/21rare.html?src=mv; Bruce Finley, Colora-
do part of "new gold rush" for rare-earth metals, DENVER POST (Jan. 16, 2011),
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_17109238; Walter T. Molano, Venezuela: Hell on Earth,
LATIN Bus. CHRON. (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.comlapp/article.aspxid=4732; Hiroko Nakata, Debate starts
on restricting foreign purchases of land, JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20l10121a2.html; United Press International, Diamonds,
timber still trouble for Liberia, UPIcOM (Jan. 7, 2011, 8:52 AM),
http://www.upi.com/ScienceNews/Resource-Wars/2011/01/07/Diamonds-timber-still-trouble-
for-Liberia/UPI-25701294408373/.
184 See generally Spence, supra note 181, at 765.
185 For an example of nations forcefully getting involved see Bloomberg News, Big Oil shares
hurt as state companies seize reserves, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2008),
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/30/business/fi-oil3O.
186 See At a Glance, SAUDI ARAMCO,
http://www.saudiaramco.com/content/www/en/home.html#our-
company%257C%252Fen%252Fhome%252Four-company%252Fat-a-glance.baseajax.html (last
visited Sept. 16, 2011).
187 See Rosneft at a Glance, RoSNEFT, http://www.rosneft.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 16,
2011).
188 See Our History, STATOIL, http://www.statoil.com/en/about/history/Pages/default3.aspx (last
visited Sept. 16, 2011).
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tamina from the case study. The purpose of listing and identifying these state-
owned entities is to illustrate the range of countries that engage in this practice
of establishing state owned energy companies. These are not limited to lesser
developed countries, but include some of the most wealthy and powerful nations
in the world. Moreover, this list is far from extensive, but is a small sample of
the wide range of state-owned energy development companies. On the other
hand, if a country decides to allow for private development of resources it may
establish a set of leasing or purchasing procedures that will still guarantee some
profit for the government. 189 Typically, in these systems the government would
receive an upfront payment and also some form of royalty as resources are pro-
duced. 190 Either way, through direct ownership or leasing and sales, the gov-
ernment will maintain a strong level of control.
B. Problems that Occur
The reasons for government involvement have been set out and the
means by which the government pursues these goals have been touched on.
Now, it is time to discuss the problems posed by governmental involvement to
the traditional arbitration model. The two problems that are posed by govern-
mental involvement are issues presented by sovereign immunity and the unwil-
ling nature of most governments to concede.
1. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity can raise multiple problems ranging from jurisdic-
tion to collection. Sovereign immunity is the right of a foreign state to be im-
mune from the jurisdiction of a certain nation's court system. 191 However, this
immunity is not absolute as it is subject to waiver. This waiver can take effect in
a host of ways. 19 2 Without waiver of sovereign immunity, a court cannot allow
suit against a nation or enforce an order or agreement that would bind it. This is
raised in many cases as a defense to arbitral enforcement; it is usually unsuc-
cessful because the state-owned entity is engaged in commercial activity and its
agreement to arbitrate will also normally waive the right to immunity.193 Even
1 See, e.g., The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (2006) (the means by
which the United States government leased property to private parties).
190 30 U.S.C. § 192 (2006) (discussing royalties).
19' See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006). This definition is from the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act,
it is a fairly common restatement of the concept.
192 See, e.g., A.R. Int'l Anti-Fraud Sys., Inc. v. Pretoria Nat. Cent. Bureau of Interpol, 634 F.
Supp. 2d 1108 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding implicit waivers of immunity under Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act ("FSIA") are found where the foreign state has agreed to arbitration in another
country, has agreed that the law of a particular country should govern the contract, or has filed a
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though most times this complication is merely that, a small stumbling point, it is
still important to address because of the ramifications that this immunity can
cause. If the immunity is not waived then the private party will be out of luck,
and because in most natural resources disputes one party is a proxy of the gov-
ernment, this issue of immunity must be addressed. After this initial issue is
disposed, the primary problem that natural resources trade in arbitration faces is
made readily apparent.
2. Government Pride
Regardless as to the form of government, whether it is based upon de-
mocracy, communism, or divine right, there is one characteristic that most gov-
ernments share: They do not like to lose. Governments like to lose even less
when they are a party to litigation or arbitration, and a judgment is ordered
against them. If a government or its agent loses a case at an arbitral panel, it
would seem they would be more likely to appeal or institute parallel proceed-
ings. 194 The reason may be one of many, such as, the government does not want
to appear weak to its nation's people, or more importantly to other countries, by
being brought to its knees by a private entity. The image of a nation losing mil-
lions or even billions of dollars to a private party raises huge political risks that
a country engages in when it enters into commercial trade. These risks can range
from leadership changel 95 to social unrest. The political face-saving that leader-
ship regimes participate in would be greatly undermined by the loss of an arbi-
tral award.
These could be some of the many reasons, but it would appear most
likely to come back to the end-all-be-all, money. The government by controlling
or being involved in the control of natural resources commands the most reliable
and, arguably, most powerful form of revenue, that being energy. The demand
for energy continues to rise, and the institution that controls that supply will
have both incredible wealth and power. These are two things that most govern-
ments, and people, view as significant.
Due to the unwillingness to admit defeat, the most noticeable disadvan-
tages of arbitration are forced to the top by governmental involvement in the
disputes. It is the government's involvement that has spurred a call for change in
the traditional arbitral model to account for these problems. Now, a final point
needs to be clear. This article is not indicating that the government being in-
volved in natural resources trade and development is good or bad, but only that
it causes the complications to the traditional arbitration model that has lead to
the problems discussed.
194 For a perfect example, see supra Part III and accompanying text.
195 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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C. Suggestions
The following section contains some proposed suggestions that may
counteract these issues raised by government involvement in arbitration. While
the first two are 'suggestions specifically aimed at natural resources trade and
development, the third could be a helpful change to international arbitration
generally. The first suggestion would be the incorporation of punitive damages
in arbitration, either through a punitive damage clause in arbitration agreements
or in the form of sanctions administered by a nation's government. The second
suggestion would be a requirement of party bonding to be established before
and held throughout the life of any project or transaction. Finally, the third sug-
gestion would be a disclosure requirement between parties on certain matters.
1. Punitive Damages
There are two means of implementing punitive damages into interna-
tional arbitration that should be given serious consideration. The first being the
entry of a punitive damage clause into an international commercial trade agree-
ment between transacting parties. The second would be through the involvement
of a party's national government where the government could issue sanctions
against either party, depending on certain circumstances.
A punitive damage clause being required or recommended into any in-
ternational commercial agreement, which submits to arbitration, could have
tremendous utility. At first glance, the idea of having punitive damages arise out
of a contractual agreement would tend to conflict directly with traditional con-
tract theory. However, this could be reconciled by indicating that this clause
would only take effect if problems came about during or following the arbitra-
tion process. Therefore, a simple breach of the contract would not trigger the
punitive damages clause, but it would require a specific set of circumstances
dealing with the arbitration.
The problems that the clause would address would be two-fold. It would
help limit parallel proceedings and also would add a further element of serious-
ness to arbitration. The threat of a high punitive damage award would act as a
deterrent from parties instituting proceedings outside of the agreed upon arbitra-
tion. This would functionally work by having the parties agree that if either of
them brings an action beyond those specified in the contract, then the arbitration
tribunal could tack-on additional punitive damages. This would obviously not
apply to actions to enforce an award in a certain jurisdiction to attach assets.
However, most other actions, unless specifically agreed upon, would trigger the
clause and the party that brought the suit in another jurisdiction would be hit
with a major punitive award.
By including this clause, arbitration would gain more teeth and further
emphasize the seriousness of its nature. At this point, it seems that many times,
parties that engage in arbitration believe they have an easy fall-back and can
bring forth subsequent litigation if they are unhappy with the result. The use of
this clause would still allow for parties to bring alternative litigation, but it
342 [Vol. 114
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would make them think twice if their pocketbook was on the line. For example,
in our case study, KBC and Pertamina had a clause in their contract prohibiting
the commencement of any suit or legal proceedings concerning the underlying
dispute of the arbitration.' 96 However, there was nothing stopping either party
from pursuing other litigation besides breaching the contract, which had already
been breached. This would not be the case with a punitive damage clause as the
parties would be held to follow the arbitration procedures and the agreed upon,
and more importantly, contracted to provisions concerning disputes or face a
hefty penalty.
The actual mechanics by which the amount would be set could take a
few different forms. It could be a set percentage of the overall compensatory
award or it could be an amount set by the arbitral panel, following its award, in
case parallel proceedings were instituted. The latter option would have some
chance of abuse and might not be the best route. However, the first option could
almost take the form of a liquidated damages clause, except it is meant to pu-
nish. The means chosen could also add to the flexibility of arbitration as well.
Now, in all fairness, most parties may not wish to agree to such a term without
some form of appeal. This could be resolved by simply having the parties stipu-
late which court or courts a party may appeal an award to in the case of abuse.
Hopefully, by the addition of this last element, parties may consider the use of a
punitive clause in their arbitration agreements.
Moreover, this clause could be particularly effective against government
parties involved in natural resources trade and development because of the con-
stant appeals and proceedings brought by government entities that do not wish
to lose. Additionally, a government would have a difficult time explaining to its
citizens why it suffered a huge punitive claim based upon its inability to follow
contracted to processes for its disputes. It is for these reasons that a punitive
damage clause could help avoid some of the problems presented by arbitration
in natural resources disputes.
As an alternative to an agreed upon punitive damage clause, the use of
government sanctions by a nation's governing authority could also be used in a
punitive nature. Government sanctions currently exist and are used frequently;
most often one government will place some form of economic sanction on
another in order to pressure that country or others to make some political or
social change.'97 This effective tool could also be carried over and used more
regularly in trade agreements that select arbitration as its means of dispute reso-
lution.
It may seem odd that a possible solution to a problem caused by gov-
ernment involvement is more government involvement; hence, an examination
of the benefits that could be had demonstrates its value. As discussed above, the
196 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
97 For a collection of United States trade sanctions, see United States Department of the Trea-
sury, Sanctions Programs and Country Information, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
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problem of government involvement in natural resources arbitration comes from
the government acting as a party to the dispute, not acting as the enforcement
mechanism. A national government can act as an enforcement mechanism
through the same way most governments accomplish goals: deterrence.
Government sanctions by their very nature are meant to punish and de-
ter certain behavior. Thus, using these sanctions more in international arbitration
would only further reinforce some of the same goals as a punitive damage
clause would, but would not require party agreement on exact terms. However,
in order to have a higher degree of legitimacy and reliability, there would need
to be a multinational treaty similar to the New York Convention. This treaty
would need to set forth the allowable sanction values as well as grounds for
enforcement and defense. These sanction values, or their calculation, and de-
fenses would need to be specifically illustrated in order to limit abuse by nation-
al governments. The benefits of this specificity would be to minimize govern-
ment discretion outside of prescribed procedures in the treaty. This treaty would
in essence act as a counterpart to the New York Convention that would allow
for signatories to apply sanctions to parties that violate arbitral awards through
either instituting unauthorized parallel proceedings or refusing to comply with a
final arbitral order.
There are various benefits of incorporating government sanctions into
commercial trade agreements. Many of these benefits would counteract the
problems created during natural resources arbitration, and thus should be consi-
dered a viable solution.
2. Party Bonding
Another tool that could be employed to help deal with the problems
posed by natural resources arbitration would be the use of financial bonding by
the parties. This would help address the problem of enforcement that goes along
with arbitral disputes. Specifically, this would be helpful for natural resources
disputes because of the huge payouts and awards that accompany them. It would
seem almost certain that most parties to a contract already have insurance or
perform checks on the other party to ensure financial integrity. However having
the parties come together during contract negotiations and decide on an amount
of money that must be set aside in case of arbitration proceedings would drasti-
cally help avoid enforcement problems. This way the parties would know that a
certain amount of money, which could be held by a neutral third-party,19 8 is
available for damages to be set-off against following the final order by an arbi-
tral panel.
As though it seems this would greatly help limit the issues of enforce-
ment and collection, many parties would likely be hesitant to turn over huge
sums of money to a third party with limited control. Due to this, some limited
198 This would be an appropriate role for a bank or other financial institution.
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appeal option would need to be given to the parties that participate in this bond-
ing process in order to ensure fairness. This may make arbitration somewhat less
efficient, but would also allow for greater enforcement, a tradeoff that many
parties may wish to take. This route of requiring bonds may also be very effec-
tive against government parties because, if a government party loses, it will not
be able try to freeze or hide assets it may have available for attachment. These
attributes of party bonding could help successfully empower victorious parties
in enforcing their claims in a timely manner.
3. Disclosure Requirements
A final suggestion that would increase the efficiency and enforcement
capabilities of arbitration would be a requirement in all agreements to disclose
the location and form of assets of each party. There would be strict limitations
and guidelines that this disclosure would have to follow. For example, only the
jurisdiction and the state or country would need to be expressly given as for the
location of the assets. It would not need to be the precise address, if it were real
estate, or bank account information, if it were cash. It would be left in very gen-
eral terms, but sufficient enough to locate them upon inquiry. As for the form of
the assets, it would also be in general terms, such as classifying the assets as real
or intellectual property.
Even if some of the above described process is done through the limited
discovery that goes on in arbitration, it should be done prior to arbitration and
required to be stated in the contracts and updated as assets change. This would
give a level of transparency to the proceedings and avoid the guessing game to
find where a party may actually have assets following the final order. These
disclosure requirements would help the arbitral process, while also still protect-
ing the privacy of the parties.
These suggestions, are at this point, purely theoretical, and the purpose
of this article was to identify the reasons for the failure of arbitration when used
in natural resources cases, while suggesting some alternatives that would need
to be implemented in order to see if any positive results followed. These sug-
gestions are meant to provide a stepping stone towards further thought and solu-
tions that need to be formulated to address this continual problem.
V. CONCLUSION
International arbitration faces a real problem. Natural resources trade
and development will continue to be prevalent throughout the international mar-
ket and unless some changes are made to the traditional arbitral model, it will be
left in the dust. Cases like the Pertamina/KBC dispute are not a unique set of
circumstances that will not be repeated. In fact, it will be quite the opposite.
There will be more situations where a government and a private entity have a
dispute arising from some energy sector development and will seek arbitration
to resolve those disputes. However, these quarrels will not benefit from the ad-
vantages of arbitration as it currently sits. A change is needed for arbitration to
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meet its potential in the field of international trade and development of natural
resources. This change does not need to be the exact kind advocated in this ar-
ticle, but it must be prompted and followed through by some organization that
has a staked interest in a better process.
It will be interesting to see if any change does occur over the next few
years. This could take the form of a specific set of model arbitral rules for natu-
ral resource cases promulgated by one of the many private international arbitra-
tion services or possibly through a multinational treaty. Regardless of the
means, change is needed. It is easy to envision that if these problems are not
curbed soon, arbitration as a form of dispute settlement in these types of cases
will no longer be used.
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